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Analysis of DOD Memorandum on
Military Assistance Programs - (MAP)

I. Summary of the DOD Memorandum

1. The primary purpose of MAP is to assist forward defense countries in creating forces for external defense.

2. Secondary objectives are to assist in creation of internal security forces and as a quid pro quo for bases. Military forces are one element of a broad range of measures required to cope with internal security. Thus, MAP has a useful but limited role in relation to this purpose. While MAP is preferred by most countries as quid pro quo for base rights, there are other possible means of payment and these should be considered for the future.

3. A final purpose of MAP is to "dispose nations favorably toward the US in their diplomacy, their public sentiment, and the direction of their internal development." The memorandum concludes that "to achieve a pro - US orientation ..., standing alone is not normally a sufficient justification for a grant military equipment program." On the other hand, training, particularly in the US, can usefully serve this objective.

4. Whenever countries have the ability to pay, sales are preferable to grant aid even if very liberal

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credit terms must be provided.

5. The programs for Laos, Thailand, NATO military infrastructure and International Military Headquarters should be transferred to the DOD budget.

6. We should provide no further grant aid to India or Pakistan.

7. We should phase out our grant military assistance to Iran after FY 1969.

8. We should continue downward pressure on the force levels of the Republic of China, and hold steady on the Korean program as long as their participation in Vietnam continues.

9. Over the next four years we should gradually phase out of grant military assistance in Latin America with the exception of training.

10. In Africa we should continue to provide grant aid only to the following six countries:

- a. Ethiopia and Libya because of bases,
- b. The Congo and Liberia to strengthen the regimes and,
- c. Tunisia and Morocco in view of the Soviet equipped build-up in Algeria.

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II. Policy Issues Raised by the MAP Memorandum

A. Introduction

Secretary McNamara's memorandum on MAP raises two broad issues. One has to do with MAP objectives and policies over the long run, the other is related to programs and program levels for FY 1968. This paper is concerned with the objectives and policy issues only.

This year's memorandum serves an extremely useful purpose by posing several fundamental issues with respect to the MAP program over the long run. This is an appropriate time to review MAP objectives and policies for several reasons:

-- Congressional pressures continue - to reduce MAP appropriations and the number of countries receiving grant MAP assistance. These pressures cannot be ignored.

-- The nature and location of the threat to US security interests continues to change. While the MAP program already reflects this change (the Far East now received 43% of grant military assistance funds) the current memorandum makes explicit the underlying threat assumptions on which MAP is based - i.e., reduced tensions with the Soviets and growing Chinese capabilities.

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However, the projected MAP policies also pose the following issues:

objectives

What are the nature and purposes of MAP, how do they relate to US security interest, and what priority should be accorded to the various objectives of MAP? How does the proposed direction of MAP policy relate to actions proposed elsewhere in the DOD budget?

B. The Nature and Purposes of MAP

Secretary McNamara lists four principal purposes of MAP:

- 1) to arm friends against the threat of external attack,
- 2) to help them protect the fabric of their societies against internal violence,
- 3) to obtain US access to bases and facilities in strategic places, and
- 4) to dispose nations favorably toward the US in their diplomacy, their public sentiment, and the direction of their internal development.

He raises three pertinent questions with respect to these purposes.

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1) Does military assistance of any kind (grant or sales) serve these purposes at all in a given situation?

2) Does military grant aid serve them better than other available instruments of policy?

3) Should the several purposes of MAP be given equal weight in determining the total number and funding levels of country programs?

A major conclusion of Secretary McNamara's memorandum is that where our primary aim is to generate favorable attitudes toward the US MAP is not ^{normally} an appropriate vehicle, and this purpose is not a sufficient justification for a MAP program. While we can well understand, and in many respects sympathize with, the factors which lead to this conclusion, we question whether it is in balance, a conclusion that is consistent with and responsive to the needs of US security. In particular, we believe that it does raise important foreign policy issues which must be carefully scrutinized.

Secretary McNamara supports his judgements as follows:

1) The number of recipients of grant aid has proliferated from 12 countries in 1950 to about 63 in 1966. Many of the recipients have only token programs with

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little military justification.

2) These small programs often help to support military forces which the countries do not need, and which detract from economic development efforts.

3) The provision of military material to one country generates demands from neighboring countries for similar equipment and this leads to local arms races.

4) There are other means of exercising US influence in many cases (e.g., development loans, P.L. 480, training programs, etc.)

5) These small programs which have relatively little direct military rationale are difficult for DOD to justify to Congress.

6) The Congress has placed a limit on the number of MAP grant aid materiel recipients, and we must have some rationale for determining which countries should be included in the MAP program.

These arguments have a good deal of validity in certain specific cases. In fact, most of them have existed in one form or another since the first program of military assistance to Greece and Turkey was inaugurated

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by President Truman in 1948, and later in the more comprehensive Mutual Defense Assistance Program of 1949. Thus, the real question is not whether the concerns expressed by the Secretary of Defense are valid but rather whether there are other considerations perhaps having even greater force. We believe that there are, and that they dictate that the liabilities cited by Secretary McNamara be minimized, but essentially accepted as the price paid to obtain vital security objectives of the US. What then are these other considerations?

1) All MAP aid has a fundamental foreign policy objective. It was so intended by the Congress as is clearly set forth in the law. In recognition of its fundamental political orientation the determination of countries who are to be recipients and the determination of the size of country programs has, since the inception of the program been vested in the Secretary of State, not the Secretary of Defense. In short, we support with MAP those countries in which our foreign policy interests dictate such support. There may be valid reasons for eliminating specific country programs. These

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might well be either that our foreign policy interests do not require such support or that MAP is an inefficient vehicle for the job. (We will comment more on this point subsequently.) Thus, we would maintain that, while in some cases there is a clearer military rationale for supporting certain forces, than there is in other cases, it is somewhat arbitrary and misleading to separate military from political purposes as the DOD memorandum does.

2) In many of the less developed countries, military leaders are an important element in the social and political structure. While we prefer civilian regimes, we also must, and in fact do, work with the ones that exist. It is presumably in our interest to approach such problems as objectively as we can, for our foreign policy cannot be limited to just those nations whose internal systems we prefer. If we acted otherwise our relations with foreign states might well be cut in half, or even half again. Moreover, in some cases military regimes offer a better prospect for stability and a stronger bulwark against Communist subversion than some of the feasible civilian alternatives (e.g., Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam to cite but three). MAP is a means of developing ties with

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the local military, influencing the structure, training and equipping of their military establishments and most of all, influencing them to take actions consistent with our objectives and interests.

3) While we should try, and do try, to avoid being drawn into competition in the supply of arms, there are times when it is more in our interest to do so than not to do so. If we offer minimal training programs while the Soviets or Chinese offer major equipment, the inducement for recipients to opt for the latter is obvious. But exercise of such an option can result in replacement of US influence on the particular government's affairs by a Soviet or Chinese influence. We do not argue that such is inevitably the case. We do not even argue that we should in every case shrink from running the risk. We do say that we should not deny to ourselves, to our own political leadership, the option which grant military assistance offers us to preclude Communist influence, rather than to be precluded by it.

4) Withdrawal of our grant aid will not, in and of itself, cut off the supply of sophisticated military equipment and dampen arms races. As noted above, there are others willing and able to substitute their equipment

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for ours. This includes not only the Soviets and the
CPR, but also some of our allies. In many cases we will
be better able to control and dampen arms competition and
local conflicts by remaining in the game. It is
highly doubtful that US supplied arms accounted for the
India-Pakistan clash. The fundamental grievances between
the two nations could have flaired whatever the source of
production of the guns and tanks. What is much clearer
is that US cut-off of arms supply to an army standardized
generally along US lines, placed enormous pressures upon
the Paks to cease hostilities as rapidly as they did.

5) Finally, as to Secretary McNamara's concern for
having to defend politically oriented programs we can
only say we agree fully. It is appropriate to place
this burden on the Secretary of Defense and the Defense
Department. If justification exists it should fall to
the State Department to stand up and be counted before
the committees of Congress. If we fail in this task,
we fail, but shifting the burden to DOD is wrong. Here
is a change in procedure which can and should be made
and which, if made, would clear the air.

In sum, we would conclude that MAP is and should
continue to be an important foreign policy tool even in

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some countries where the military rationale for a program is decidedly secondary. We obviously should continue to scrutinize the value of MAP in each country on a case-by-case basis to assure that the use of this tool in a given circumstance does meet US objectives and to assure that other techniques will not do the job better. However, we should not eliminate MAP programs just because there is not a straightforward military or base rights rationale for the program.

C. With respect to the role of MAP in external defense, Mr. McNamara concludes: "Where the external defense of an ally is a central problem and where the local economy is weak, MAP is an appropriate, indeed a unique, instrument of US policy." We agree with this conclusion.

Moreover, as we have pointed out in commenting upon the DOD Ground Forces Memorandum, we see at least three trends which make for an increasing possibility of external aggression at the lower end of the hostilities spectrum. The first is a continuance of wars of liberation. The second is the greater latitude which the Soviets may feel to participate in lower level conventional hostilities, given the effect of the strategic nuclear stalemate and third, the coming into existence of independent highly

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nationalistic states has already, and will unquestionably in the future, involve frictions among them. What Secretary McNamara's memorandum on Military Assistance does not answer any more than does his memorandum on US ground forces, is how the US should formulate its policies and programs to meet such circumstances. We feel, for example, that there has been too much of a tendency in the planning of DOD material programs to assume, perhaps implicitly, that it would be US force, in the first instance, which would be injected into international disturbances in the future. We do not believe this view is held by Mr. McNamara, but we do believe that the programs for developing our own US capabilities are, to a large extent, implicitly predicated on just such a concept. Our own feeling is that the US should not establish itself as "the world's policeman" - a concept which the Secretary of State has frequently enunciated. But this may well mean that we have to find other ways for providing the means to secure at least minimum stability, and that specifically might well require military assistance. Moreover, where hostilities threaten to get beyond the bounds of indigenous capabilities, we must be

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sure that there is a capacity to project US forces into the conflict, if indeed that turns out to be the course which our policy leaders decide upon. Here again MAP fits into the picture. It is not enough for the US to have men, arms and transportation if we lack overflight rights, if we lack terminal base facilities and if there is not an initial indigenous military force which is capable of holding the fort until US forces arrive.

We are bound to say that the concept of the proper relationship between US and indigenous allied forces has not been clearly thought through and articulated in any of the DOD memoranda, including the one on Military Assistance. And we hasten to add the responsibility is at least as much that of the State Department as it is of the Department of Defense. For we should, in close and joint cooperation with DOD, define more clearly what our policy objectives are and how indigenous and US military force and forces relate to the accomplishment of those objectives.

D. With respect to internal security the memorandum concludes:

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"Internal security, resting as it does on actions across the entire socio-political spectrum must be achieved primarily through the efforts of the country itself, and the most important efforts are non-military. Moreover, there is a very practical limit to the feasibility and utility of US involvement in these internal struggles ... When the need to provide internal security is the primary justification for military assistance ... great care must be taken to tailor the program to the problem, and not to provide equipment and services which are appropriate to the problem of external defense."

These are appropriate general qualifications or guidelines to suggest with respect to the role of MAP. However, the fact remains that the US has found it in our interest to involve ourselves where threats to internal security have emerged (e.g., Thailand), and strengthening of military and paramilitary forces has been an element in such programs. The recognition that MAP alone cannot solve the problem may suggest the need for larger and more imaginative efforts in other fields rather than the reduction and constriction of MAP. In short, the very complexity of the internal security problem which is cited in the memorandum suggest that the criteria for MAP aid need to be subtle and flexible.

E. "The use of MAP assistance as a quid pro quo for base rights is sometimes cumbersome, but it is the form

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of payment most in demand by the countries providing bases," concludes the memorandum. However, the desirability of using other means of payment, where possible, is suggested. No changes are suggested at this time, and provision is made for continued MAP aid to Spain, Portugal, Ethiopia and Libya primarily on these grounds. However, the bases considered by DOD are primarily military bases. Our important intelligence facilities in several areas do not appear to be taken into account in considering the role of MAP in relation to bases. For example, no MAP grant aid for Pakistan is proposed, and while there are important political reasons for this position, this policy

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Similarly, the rationale for the Turkish program is based solely on the external defense objective without explicit recognition of the important bases that we hold there. While recognition of the base requirement would not necessarily change the character of MAP for Turkey, we believe it well might. Our recent discussions

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with the Turks indicate that additional MAP will be a quid pro quo for extension of present vital facilities agreements in Turkey.

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